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I. PART I
Introduction
The patient entered the hospital suffering from severe cardiogenic shock.1 His
heart had deteriorated; each breath became a greater labor. Immediate surgery was
necessary to repair a ruptured mitral valve2 – a complicated procedure with the level
of physical atrophy.
For seventeen hours, Dr. Sandu3 struggled to replace the leaking valve.4 When
these efforts failed, he rushed the patient to another hospital and placed him on an
artificial heart.5 The entire ordeal took twenty-four grueling hours to complete;
however, these exertions were in vain. Several days later the patient succumbed to
his condition. Dr. Sandu personally offered his condolences to the family.6
A year later, Dr. Sandu opened his mail to discover that he would be embroiled in
a very different struggle. The family of the decedent had sued for malpractice. The
news shook Dr. Sandu. He had surpassed every conceivable standard of medical
care but now found himself fighting for his professional life. “I went through hell,”
he would say.7
Dr. Sandu soon learned the plaintiff had employed a “hired gun” to support its
claim.8 The expert practiced the barest amount of surgery, enough to maintain an
active license.9 The “hired gun” then devoted the remainder of his practice to selling

1

Cardiogenic shock is a life threatening reduction of blood flow to the body caused by
damage to the heart’s ability to function. EUGENE BRAUNWALD, BRAUNWALD HEART DISEASE
- TEXTBOOK OF CARDIOVASCULAR MEDICINE 569 (4th ed. 1992). Because blood transports
essential substrates, such as oxygen, a severe reduction in blood flow results in an insufficient
supply of these essential substrates, resulting in a failure of the body’s vital organ systems. Id.
2
The mitral valve is the inlet valve to the main pumping chamber of the heart. This valve
closes the pumping chamber during each heartbeat. LEONARD S. LILLY, PATHOPHYSIOLOGY OF
HEART DISEASE 3 (1st ed. 1993). A rupture to the mitral valve prevents the chamber from
properly closing. Without the chamber closing, contraction of the heart will send blood
flowing in both directions rather than forward into the body. This condition was the main
contributing factor to the cardiogenic shock threatening the patient’s life. Id.
3
The following narrative is based on actual events experienced by a respected
cardiovascular surgeon. Because the physician preferred to remain anonymous, subsequent
citations will refer to him as “Anonymous,” and the text will refer to him as “Doctor Sandu.”
4
Telephone Interview with Anonymous, Cardiovascular Surgeon, in Cleveland, Ohio (Oct.
18, 2006) (on file with the author).
5

Id.

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Id.

9

Id.
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his testimony to the highest bidder.10 He knew what he was doing was wrong, and
refused to look Dr. Sandu in the eye throughout the trial.11
It immediately became apparent that the “expert” had no idea what he was
talking about.12 The plaintiff had hired a third rate doctor to sustain a spurious claim.
According to Dr. Sandu, by the time cross–examination had concluded, the so called
expert looked completely incompetent.13
The lawsuit has carved an indelible scar into Dr. Sandu’s personal and
professional life. It has “left a very bad feeling inside me,” he said. “You loose faith
in people . . . [y]ou become a different person.”14 Prior to the lawsuit, Dr. Sandu
“never blinked to take on surgery.”15 Now he hesitates before accepting cases that
could expose him to liability.16
The experience of Dr. Sandu is far from unique. A recent Harvard study revealed
that “only seventeen percent, or approximately one out of six, of medical malpractice
civil actions actually filed [within the test state], appeared to actually involve a
negligent injury.”17 Medical malpractice litigation is replete with examples of “hired
guns” who testify “not because the statements are an honest, scientific assessment of
the case at hand,” but because they have been paid enough to make the statement.18
For some doctors, expert medical testimony “is their business, and their testimony
can be bought and paid for.”19
The issue is exacerbated because many of these alleged experts no longer
actively practice medicine20 and frequently testify in arenas far from their areas of
expertise.21 The consequence is that a statement of opinion gets presented as fact to a
jury which has no way of knowing that it is contrary to any scientific or medical
standard.22 This paid testimony furnishes a breeding ground for frivolous lawsuits
and nurtures the expanding malpractice crisis.

10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Id.

16

Id.

17

James A. Comodeca et al., Killing the Golden Goose by Evaluating Medical Care
Through the Retroscope: Tort Reform From the Defense Perspective, 31 U. DAYTON L. REV.
207, 212 (2006) (citing David M. Studdert, Medical Malpractice, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 283
(2004)). The study confined its inquiry to the state of New York.
18

Noah Schaffer, Medical Experts on the Radar, 1 MASS. MED. L. REP. 1, 14 (2006).

19

Id. at 1.

20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Id. at 14.
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Ohio attempted to solve this problem with the passage of Ohio Revised Code
section 2743.43,23 hereinafter referred to as the “medical expert statute.” The
legislation fundamentally alters Ohio rules governing medical expert testimony in
two essential ways. First, the law requires that an expert dedicate “three-fourths of
[his or her] time to the active practice of medicine or surgery.”24 Second, the law
mandates an expert practice “in the same or substantially similar [medical] specialty
as the defendant” in order to be considered competent to testify against him.25
These legislative enactments appear to clash with Ohio Rules of Evidence
regarding the competency of expert witnesses, which requires that medical experts
devote only one-half of their time to active clinical practice.26 At first glance, the
statute appears to violate the Ohio Constitution, which provides the Ohio Supreme
Court with the sole power to promulgate rules of evidence and court procedure.27
However, this assessment is incorrect.
The same Constitutional provision
empowering the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure prohibits the Court
from creating rules that infringe upon substantive rights.28
23
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.43(A)(2) (West 2006).
(A) No person shall be deemed competent to give expert testimony on the liability
issues in a medical claim . . . unless . . . 2) Such person devotes three-fourths of the
person's professional time to the active clinical practice of medicine or surgery,
osteopathic medicine and surgery, or podiatric medicine and surgery, or to its
instruction in an accredited university. Id.
24

Id.

25

Christopher M. Ernst, et al., Baldwin’s Oh. Prac. Tort L. § 8:22 (2006).

26

OHIO R. EVID. 601(D). Note that the Ohio Rules of Evidence are devoid of a parallel
requirement that the medical expert practice in the same or substantially the same specialty as
the defendant:
Every person is competent to be a witness except . . . (D) A person giving expert
testimony on the issue of liability in any claim asserted in any civil action against a
physician, podiatrist, or hospital arising out of the diagnosis, care, or treatment of any
person by a physician or podiatrist, unless the person testifying is licensed to practice
medicine and surgery, osteopathic medicine and surgery, or podiatric medicine and
surgery by the state medical board or by the licensing authority of any state, and
unless the person devotes at least one-half of his or her professional time to the active
clinical practice in his or her field of licensure, or to its instruction in an accredited
school. This division shall not prohibit other medical professionals who otherwise are
competent to testify under these rules from giving expert testimony on the appropriate
standard of care in their own profession in any claim asserted in any civil action
against a physician, podiatrist, medical professional, or hospital arising out of the
diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person.
Id.
27
28

ERNST ET AL., supra note 27.

OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).
(B) The supreme court shall prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all
courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive
right. Proposed rules shall be filed by the court, not later than the fifteenth day of
January, with the clerk of each house of the general assembly during a regular session
thereof, and amendments to any such proposed rules may be so filed not later than the
first day of May in that session. Such rules shall take effect on the following first day
of July, unless prior to such day the general assembly adopts a concurrent resolution of
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Rules governing the competency of medical experts inherently impact substantive
rights in two major ways. First, they impact the right to a trial by jury.29 Second,
these rules infringe upon the right to access a court of law.30 As a result, the Rule of
Evidence impermissibly infringes upon substantive rights in violation of Ohio
Constitutional limitations on rules of practice and procedure.31 Furthermore, even if
the evidentiary rule governing medical experts is not nullified, certain provisions of
the medical expert statute are still valid as acceptable extensions to the rules of court
procedure.32
This article will explore the constitutionality of Ohio Revised Code section
2743.43 in light of the Ohio Rules of Evidence. Part I introduces the medical expert
issue in the state of Ohio. Part II will be divided into two sections. Section A
explains the standard of care for malpractice claims that requires an expert medical
explanation. Section B provides background on the evolution of the standard of care
in the state of Ohio. Part III will be divided into three sections. Section A explores
the Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 5(B). Section B explores the Ohio Rules
of Evidence. Finally, Section C explores Ohio Revised Code section 2743.43. Part
IV will be divided into two sections examining the constitutionality of the Ohio
Rules of Evidence, ultimately arguing that the Ohio statutory provision must control
because rules of evidence regulating the competency of medical experts
impermissibly infringe upon the substantive rights of tort victims. Section A
addresses the three-fourths requirement of Ohio Revised Code section 2743.43 and is
divided into five subparts that examine the substantive nature of rules governing
medical experts. Section B addresses the same or substantially the same clause of
the Revised Code section 2743.43. Part V will conclude the article.
II. PART II
A. The Professional Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice Litigation
Medical malpractice is a specialized branch of the negligence tree.33 Under this
branch, physicians are not held to the standard of the reasonably prudent person.34
disapproval. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect
after such rules have taken effect.
Id.
29

See infra pp. 141-42.

30

See infra pp. 142-44.

31

See discussion infra Parts IV.A.5, IV.A.6.

32

See infra pp. 145-48.

33

DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 631 (2000). “The tort action for medical malpractice
is a negligence action, accompanied by the usual rules attendant to such actions. The plaintiff
must prove negligence, causation and damages”. Id. However, because physicians stand in a
special relationship of trust to their patients, “the duty of care owed by medical and other
professionals is usually expressed in and applied in a special way.” Id. See also Fred L.
Cohen, The Expert Medical Witness in Legal Perspective, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 185, 191 (2004);
JAMES T. O’REILLY, OHIO PERSONAL INJURY PRACTICE §14:3 (2006) (“An Action for medical
malpractice is a negligence action.”).
34

DOBBS, supra note 33, at 633.
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Medical professionals cannot be held to this standard “because the profession of
medicine . . . has a very distinct and separate body of knowledge that is considered
beyond the grasp of the average ‘reasonable person.’”35 Instead, doctors are required
to employ “the knowledge, skill and care ordinarily possessed by members of the
profession in good standing”36 in a similar practice and under similar
circumstances.37 Simply put, this professional standard of care requires “what is
customary and usual” within the practice of medicine.38
Because the applicable standard relies so heavily on custom, the medical
profession has the privilege of “setting [its] own legal standards of conduct, merely
by adopting [its] own practices,” a privilege “emphatically denied to other groups.”39
The rationale for this concession is “the layman’s ignorance of medical matters and
the necessity of expert testimony”40 to explain it. Because doctors obtain a highly
specialized subset of knowledge, an expert is essential to explain the appropriate
standard of care.41 A medical malpractice claim cannot be pursued without this
expert.42
This standard does not mean that a doctor is required to be perfect.43 It does not
even mean that a doctor must be average.44 Rather, a doctor is judged only against
members of the medical community who are in good professional standing. Of these
members, only “the minimum common skill [… is] looked to.”45 If a doctor has
achieved a special degree of skill, however, the standard will be the skill possessed
by members of that specialty.46 On the other end of the spectrum, there is not a

35

Cohen, supra note 33, at 191.

36

W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 187 (5th ed. 1984).

37
See Cross v. Huttenlochler, 440 A.2d 952, 954 (Conn. 1981) (“A physician is under a
duty to his patient to exercise that degree of care, skill, and diligence which physicians in the
same general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in similar cases.”)
38

KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, at 189.

39

Id.

40

Id.

41

Cohen, supra note 33, at 191.

42

DOBBS, supra note 33, at 633. “The professional standard differs from the reasonable
care standard also in that courts traditionally require the malpractice plaintiff to establish the
professional standard by expert testimony. No such category-wide rule applies in ordinary
negligence cases.” Id.
43

Tim Cramm et al., Ascertaining Customary Care in Malpractice Cases: Asking Those
Who Know, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699, 702 (2002).
44

KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, at 187.

45

Id. See also Shevak v. United States, 528 F. Supp. 427, 432 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (“[A]
doctor does not have to show that he performed at any ‘ultimate or maximum’ level of care,
but only that he conducted himself above or equal to the minimum standard of accepted
professional practice.”)
46

KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, at 187.
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similar rule for neophytes to the medical profession.47 A “hospital . . . [is] obliged to
provide physicians who . . . meet that standard” 48 of care found throughout the
medical community. The standard is always a floor, never a ceiling.49
Traditionally, courts made allowances for the “type of community in which the
physician carrie[d] on his practice . . . [A] country doctor would not be expected to
have the equipment, facilities, libraries, contacts opportunities for learning, or
experience afforded large cities.”50 In effect, the rule disqualified those experts who
could not demonstrate a familiarity “with the standard of care in the relevant
locality.”51 With the advent of electronic communication, advances in medical
procedures have been placed at the fingertips of even the most pioneering physician.
As a result, most courts have “abandon[ed] a fixed locality rule in favor of treating
the community as merely one factor” in determining the standard of care.52 Still
other jurisdictions have abandoned the locality rule “outright … [applying] a general
national standard” in all medical malpractice cases.53
The utilization of custom fundamentally alters the role of the jury in medical
malpractice litigation.54 In typical negligence cases, the jury is asked to assess the
reasonableness of a defendant’s actions.55 In malpractice cases, the jury is asked
whether the doctor adhered to the custom employed by other physicians, a custom
that can only be explained by a medical expert. The jury’s “assessment of whether
the custom is reasonable or unreasonable is irrelevant [so long as] the defendant
followed that custom.” 56
Surprisingly, even experts can disagree about the proper standard of care in a
particular circumstance.57 Where there are competing schools of medical thought,
47

Id. See also McBride v. United States, 462 F.2d 72, 74 (9th Cir. 1972) (“[T]he duty of
care owed to the patient does not vary according to the doctor’s individual knowledge or
education”).
48

McBride, 462 F.2d at 74.

49

KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, at 187.

50

Id. at 187-88. Under the locality rule, “[i]f a town’s six doctors all ignored helpful new
drugs for treatment of the plaintiff’s condition; none of them would be guilty of medical
malpractice for failing to prescribe such a drug when it was needed.” DOBBS, supra note 30,
at 635.
51

Cramm et al., supra note 43, at 706.

52
KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, at 188. Courts now examine “the medical community in
the same or similar localities, in the state, or in the nation as a whole for appropriate
standards.” DOBBS, supra note 33, at 636-37. If a physician is a board certified medical
specialist, the standard is that of the standard adhered to by that specialty. Id.
53

KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, at 188.

54
DOBBS, supra note 33, at 633. Because the professional standard asks only whether the
physician conformed to the relevant custom, the physician cannot be found negligent so long
as he followed that custom. See also Cramm et al., supra note 43, at 702.
55

Cramm et al., supra note 43, at 702.

56

Id. at 702-03.

57

KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, at 187.
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the physician is judged “according to the tenets of the school the doctor professed to
follow.”58 This does not mean that any individual can set up shop and establish a
school of medical thought free of liability.59 A “school” must be recognized by
others in the medical community.60 It must possess definitive principals.61 It must be
in line with “a respectable minority of the profession.”62
As a practical matter, the school of thought doctrine operates as an affirmative
defense.63 The defendant retains the burden of proving that a second school exists
and that he or she adhered to it.64 Its invocation reduces the trial into a battle of the
experts, with the plaintiff attempting to prove “that no such school exists, that it
represents a fringe element, or that the second school . . . has become obsolete.”65 It
is left, oddly enough, to the jury to trudge through this medical marsh land and select
the applicable custom to which the doctor should have adhered.
B. The Standard of Care for Medical Malpractice in the State of Ohio
To establish a medical malpractice claim in the State of Ohio, a plaintiff must
prove three essential elements.66 First, the “applicable standard of care [must be
established] usually through expert testimony.”67 Second, the plaintiff must “show a
negligent failure on the part of the defendant to render treatment in conformity with
the standard of care.”68 Finally, the plaintiff must “demonstrate that the resulting
injury was proximately caused by defendant’s negligence.”69
58

Id. When there are two schools of medical thought, a physician is free to adhere to
either custom without fear of incurring liability. DOBBS, supra note 33, at 633.
59

KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, at 187.

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Cramm et al., supra note 43, at 705.

64

Id.

65

Id.

66

Promen v. Ward, 591 N.E.2d 813, 815 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the judgment
was against the manifest weight of evidence because the jury instructions emphasized the
standard of care for a negligence action, not a medical malpractice action - which is not
determined by blind adherence to the standard practices within a given specialty); see also
Bruni v. Tatsumi, 346 N.E.2d 673, 675 (Ohio 1976).
67
Promen, 591 N.E.2d at 815. See also JAMES T. O’REILLY, OHIO PERSONAL INJURY
PRACTICE § 14:7 (2006). “The standard of care ordinarily must be established by expert
testimony unless the conduct is within the common knowledge and experience of jurors.” Id.
68
69

Promen, 591 N.E.2d at 815.

Id. See also JAMES T. O’REILLY, OHIO PERSONAL INJURY PRACTICE § 14:11 (2006).
“Proximate cause is a happening or event that, as a natural and continuous sequence, produces
an injury without which the result would not have occurred.” Id. In medical malpractice
litigation, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s
negligence probably caused the injury – defined as “more likely than not,” or greater than fifty
percent. Id.
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Ohio has arguably eschewed the custom-based professional standard of care,
described above, in favor of the traditional reasonable prudent person inquiry.70 This
shift alters the landscape of medical malpractice jurisprudence in Ohio by permitting
the plaintiff to reach a jury simply by establishing “that the defendant’s care did not
meet the standards of a reasonable physician.”71 Under this system of medical
liability, breach of custom no longer serves as a prerequisite to medical malpractice,
and adherence cannot establish a complete defense.72 Despite the revocation of
custom in Ohio, the appropriate standard of care to which a physician should have
adhered must still be proven through the use of expert testimony.73
The shift from a custom based inquiry occurred when the Ohio Supreme Court
refused to blindly follow the appropriate medical convention in malpractice claims.74
In Hall v. Ault, a surgical team inadvertently left a sponge inside the patient’s chest
cavity.75 The offending physician relied upon the “uncontroverted”76 custom of
delegating the sponge count to nurses as a complete defense to the action against
him.77
The Ohio Supreme Court, however, rejected this stance. 78 Custom, they said,
could not serve as a complete defense to a charge of medical negligence: “[t]he
overwhelming weight of authority supports the general rule that customary methods
of conduct do not furnish a test that is conclusive, or fix a standard.”79 Physicians in
medical malpractice litigation should always be compared to an ordinary physician
under similar circumstances.80 A medical professional, therefore, would be held to
the same reasonableness standard applied to every other tortfeasor.
Ault produced an ambiguous state of affairs concerning the sweep of the court’s
ruling.81 Subsequent case law clarified the Ohio Supreme Court’s intention to
jettison custom from the medical malpractice calculation.82

70

Phillip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the
Millenium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 175-78 (2000).
71

Id. at 177.

72

Id.

73

67 OHIO JUR. 3D Malpractice § 45 (2006).

74

See Hall v. Ault, 164 N.E. 518 (Ohio 1928) (holding in action for negligence, conformity
to a custom cannot furnish a test that is conclusive or controlling, but conformity is a
circumstance to be weighed or considered by the trier of fact).
75

Id. at 519.

76

Id. at 521.

77

Id.

78

Id. at 522.

79

Id. at 523.

80

Id. at Syllabus.

81

Courts were uncertain whether Ault should be limited to its specific facts or whether it
spelled the death knell of custom based medical malpractice.
82
See Bruni v. Tatsumi, 346 N.E.2d 673, 676 (Ohio 1976) (holding in part that the
standard of care in a medical malpractice action is the performance of an action or omitting to
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In Bruni v. Tatsumi, the Ohio Supreme Court further developed the standard that
would serve as the foundation for all future medical malpractice litigation. In order
to establish liability, a plaintiff must show, “by a preponderance of evidence83 that a
physician “did some particular thing or things that physicians and surgeons . . . of
ordinary skill, care and diligence would not have done under the same or similar
circumstances.”84 Thus in Ohio, “[w]hile customary methods and practices are
highly relevant in determining the standard of care conformity to a recognized
practice is not conclusive.”85 A jury is to consider “customary practices as evidence
of the standard of care . . . but ultimately the jury must determine whether the
method or practice used by defendant was reasonable under the circumstances.”86
Ohio has also partitioned medical cases based on the complexity of the malpractice
claim. The first class of cases involves medical matters outside the comprehension
of the average layman. These cases require reliance upon expert guidance because
“[t]here can be no other guide.”87 Failure to secure an expert is fatal to a plaintiff’s
case and “there is no evidence . . . to be submitted to the jury.”88
The second class of cases occurs when “the lack of skill or care of the physician
and surgeon is so apparent as to be within the comprehension of laymen and requires
only common knowledge and experience to understand and judge it.”89 Unlike a
complex medical malpractice case, a plaintiff will be able to reach a jury without
obtaining a medical expert. The litigant will rely instead upon the jurors’ common
knowledge and experience.90
perform an action that a physician or surgeon of ordinary skill, care and diligence would have
done or not done under similar circumstances).
83

Id. at syllabus.

84

Id. at 676. The test in its entirety reads as follows:
whether the physician, in the performance of his service, either did some particular
thing or things that physicians and surgeons, in that medical community, of ordinary
skill, care and diligence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances,
or failed or omitted to do some particular thing or things which physicians and
surgeons of ordinary skill, care and diligence would have done under the same or
similar circumstances. He is required to exercise the average degree of skill, care and
diligence exercised by members of the same medical specialty community in similar
situations.
Id.
85

Promen v. Ward, 591 N.E.2d 813, 817 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (citing Ault v. Hall, 164
N.E. 518, (para. two of syllabus Ohio 1928); see also 67 OHIO JUR. 3D Malpractice § 44
(2006). “Customary methods or conduct do not furnish a test that is conclusive or controlling
on the question of negligence.” 67 OHIO JUR. 3D Malpractice § 44 (2006).
86

Id.

87

Bruni, 346 N.E.2d at 677.

88

Id.

89

Id.

90

Berdyck v. Shinde, 613 N.E.2d 1014, 1022 (Ohio 1993). “In a negligence action
involving conduct within the common knowledge and experience of jurors an expert is not
required.” Id. The classic example of a case in which a medical expert will not be required to
reach a jury occurs when the physician leaves a foreign object inside the cavity of a patient.
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Finally, as mentioned above, many jurisdictions have discarded the locality rule
in light of the shrinking information divide created by modern forms of
communication.91 Ohio is a member of the growing consensus considering the
locality rule to be “antiquated and unrealistic.”92 As a result, the standard of care
owed to a patient is that which is adhered to by the particular community in which
the physician specializes, not the particular community in which the physician
practices; “[g]eographical conditions or circumstances do not control either the
standard of the specialist’s care or the competence of the expert’s testimony.”93
III. PART III
A. The Constitution of Ohio, Article IV, Sec. 5(B)
Article IV of the Ohio Constitution “was the linchpin of the . . . Modern Courts”
movement.94 Post World War II America witnessed an explosion in litigation,
glutting the court system and grinding its administration to a halt.95 Prior to Article
IV’s enactment, a haphazard amalgam of common law, chancery procedure and
statutory legislation dictated court room procedure.96 Article IV, referred to as the
Modern Courts Amendment, centralized and simplified this arcane system, placing
the rules governing practice and procedure firmly within the ambit of the Ohio
Supreme Court.
Under Article IV, Section 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution, the Ohio Supreme Court
is empowered to oversee the “rules governing practice and procedure in all courts of
the state.”97 This authority is plenary, circumscribed only by the provision that
procedural rules may not restrict substantive rights.98 A rule that impinges on a

No expert would be necessary in this instance because the negligence of some party is self
evident.
91

It should also be noted that Ohio follows the “’two schools of thought doctrine’ . . . [as
a] defense in medical malpractice actions.” JAMES T. O’REILLY, OHIO PERSONAL INJURY
PRACTICE § 14:16 (2006). The doctrine operates as an affirmative defense to a charge of
medical malpractice. Id. Under the “schools of thought doctrine,” the defendant has the
burden of producing evidence that there were other methods of diagnosis and treatment for the
particular medical condition. Id. In using this defense, the defendant attempts to establish that
“[t]he mere fact that an alternative method was used is not proof of negligence.” Id. The jury
must then decide whether the procedure used conformed “with the standard of care required of
a practitioner in the defendant’s field of practice.” Id.
92

Bruni, 346 N.E.2d at 679. See also James T. O’Reilly, OHIO PERSONAL INJURY PRACTICE
§ 14:6 (2006).
93

Bruni, 346 N.E.2d at 679.

94

OHIO CONST. art. IV cmt. 1990.

95

Id.

96

Id.

97

OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).

98

Id.
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substantive right is impermissible.99 Thus rules promulgated under Section 5(B)
supersede conflicting statutes affecting practice and procedure in Ohio courts, but
not statutes affecting fundamental rights.100 Despite these restrictions upon
legislative function, Ohio lawmakers retain the authority to enact “statutes which
supplement or complement the rules” of practice or procedure. 101
B. The Ohio Rule of Evidence 601
Pursuant to the authority granted under Article IV, Section 5(B), the Ohio
Supreme Court enacted Rule 601. This Rule of Evidence contains a special provision
governing the competency of expert witnesses testifying in medical malpractice
litigation.102 Under Rule 601(D), a medical expert must devote “at least one-half of
his or her professional time to the active clinical practice in his or her field of
licensure, or its instruction in an accredited school.” 103 This requirement differs from
the medical expert statute, which requires a medical expert to devote three-fourths of
his or her time to the active clinical practice of medicine.104
C. Ohio Revised Code § 2743.43
Prior to the creation of Rule 601(D), the Ohio legislature had already weighed
into the Tort Reform debate. In 1979, it passed the medical expert statute to regulate
the testimony of medical witnesses.105 In its initial conception, the medical expert
statute required a specialist to “devote three-fourths of [his or her] time to the active
clinical practice of medicine.”106 In 2004, the Ohio legislature appended the statute,
adding a requirement that an expert practice “in the same or substantially similar
specialty as the defendant.”107 In adopting this amendment, the legislature implicitly
ratified the three-fourths requirement for medical expert competency.108

99

Id.

100

OHIO CONST. art. IV cmt. 1990.

101

Id.

102

OHIO R. EVID. 601 (D).

103

Id.

104

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.43 (A)(2) (West 2006).

105

Id. The statute became effective 7-28-75, § 2743.43.

106

Id. § 2743.43 (A)(2).

107

Id. The statute does create an exception for an expert who practices in a different
specialty if he or she can show “that the standards of care and practice in the two specialties
are similar and the expert has substantial familiarity between the specialties.” Id.
108

H.R. 215, 125th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess (Ohio 2004). The legislature also added the
requirement that:
[a] witness . . . is not competent to give expert testimony in a medical claim, pursuant
to the act, unless the witness is certified in a medical specialty by a board recognized
by the American Board of Medical Specialties . . . as having acknowledged expertise
and training directly related to the particular health care matter at issue.
Id.
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IV. PART IV
A. The Three Fourths Requirement
1. Introduction
From its inception, the medical expert statute controlled the competency of
experts in medical liability claims.109 However, pursuant to its authority under the
Ohio Constitution, the Supreme Court promulgated R. 601(D) in 1990, sixteen years
after the enactment of the medical expert statute.110 As previously mentioned, this
new rule appears to reduce the requirements under the medical expert statute from
three-fourths of a physician’s professional time to one-half.111 This effort results in
conflicts between the Rules of Evidence and portions of the medical expert statute
that refers to competency. Determining which provision controls requires an inquiry
into: 1) the supplemental nature of the medical expert statute, 2) the distinction
between substantive and procedural rights, 3) substantive rights under Article IV,
Section 5(B), 4) the impact of competency rules on the right to a jury trial, and 5) the
right to access a court of law.
2. The medical expert statute as a supplement to Rule 601(D)
Because the medical expert statute requires that an expert devote more time to the
practice of medicine, the three-fourths requirement could be viewed as a supplement
to the rules of evidence. Under constitutional rules of construction, the legislature is
permitted to provide additional requirements to any rule of court procedure.112
However, because the Ohio Supreme Court enacted Rule 601(D) years after the
medical expert statute had already become effective, this construction is doubtful. A
statutory provision can hardly be deemed to supplement a procedural rule that has
been subsequently adopted to displace it.
This skepticism is confirmed by the staff notes accompanying Rule 601(D). The
notes expressly state, “[t]he rule as adopted supersedes R.C. 2743.43.”113 Therefore,
the Advisory Committee that proposed Rule 601(D) clearly intended for it to
supplant the medical expert statute.114
Subsequent case law confirms this interpretation.115 The Ohio courts that have
interpreted Rule 601(D) have consistently held that medical experts must devote one-

109

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.43 (West 2006). The statute became effective 7-28-75.

110

OHIO R. EVID. 601(D). The amendment became effective 7-1-91. Id.

111

Id.

Id.

112
See discussion supra Part III, Section A for the applicable rules of construction under
OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).
113

Ohio Evid. R. 601(D), 1980 staff note.

114

See discussion infra Part IV, Section B.

115

It is important to note that no Ohio court has expressly held that Rule 601(D)
supersedes the medical expert statute.
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half of their professional time to the active practice of medicine.116 In Fahey v.
Abouhossein, 117 for instance, the court of appeals upheld the disqualification of an
expert witness under Rule 601(D). While the witness had extensive medical
publications, he had not devoted one-half of his time to the active clinical practice of
medicine as required under the Ohio Rules of Evidence. Therefore, he could not
testify on behalf of the plaintiff.118
In another Ohio case interpreting the competency of a medical expert, the court
based its decision primarily on the requirements under Rule 601(D).119 In Aldridge v.
Gardner, the court of appeals, while noting the interplay among the medical expert
statute and Rule 601(D),120 held that the medical expert was competent to testify.121
The expert, while only devoting twenty percent of his present time to the active
clinical practice of medicine, had clearly met Rule 601(D)’s requirements through
the knowledge accrued over twenty years of practicing medicine.122
The preceding analysis demonstrates that the three-fourths requirement of the
medical expert statute, as a rule of court procedure, is clearly displaced by Rule
601(D). However, the Supreme Court’s power to adopt rules of procedure under
Article IV, Section 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution is expressly circumscribed by its
effect on substantive rights. Specifically, procedural rules “shall not abridge, enlarge
or modify any substantive right,”123 the result being that the efficacy of the threefourths requirement hinges on its status as a rule governing substantive rights.
116
See, e.g., Fahey v. Abouhossein, No. 17215, 1999 WL 89737, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb.
12, 1999) (“The purpose of . . . Evid.R. 601(D) is ‘to preclude testimony by the physician who
earns his living or spends much of his time testifying against his fellows as a professional
witness . . .’” (quoting McCrory v. State, 423 N.E.2d 156, 159 (Ohio 1981)); Williams v.
Reynolds Road Surgical Center, Ltd., No. L-02-1144, 2004 WL 628972, at *4-5 (Ohio Ct.
App. March 31, 2004) (holding the trial court did not err in allowing the testimony of medical
expert who devoted 60 to 70 percent of his professional time on “programs and other things”);
Aldridge v. Gardner, 825 N.E.2d 201, 204 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (holding a physician who
spends eighty percent of his time working for insurance companies was engaged in the active
clinical practice of medicine under OHIO R. EVID. 601(D) because he had devoted twenty
years to the clinical practice of medicine and devoted the remainder of his time to the clinical
practice of medicine); Cunningham v. St. Alexis Hosp. Med. Ctr., 758 N.E.2d 188, 197-98
(Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (holding a physician who spends approximately two-thirds to seventyfive percent of his time doing research is not competent to testify under OHIO R. EVID.
601(D)); Smith v. Sass, Friedman & Assocs., Inc., No. 81953, 2004 WL 229515 (Ohio Ct.
App. Feb. 5, 2004) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a witness
competent when he devoted fifty percent of his time to patient care).
117

Fahey, 1999 WL 89737, at *2.

118

Id. (holding that rationale behind competency rules for medical experts was “to exclude
the testimony of the ‘hired gun,’ a professional witness whose actual specialty is testimony
instead of treatment. Such witnesses . . . lack the current basis of experience . . . necessary to
form a judgment truly helpful to the trier of fact.”).
119

See Aldridge, 825 N.E.2d 201.

120

Id. at 205.

121

Id. at 206.

122

Id.

123

OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).
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3. The Distinction Between Substantive and Procedural Rights
A rule of court procedure that impacts a substantive right is impermissible under
the Ohio Constitution. The distinction between substantive and procedural rights is
difficult to ascertain, though courts have attempted define the difference.124
Generally speaking, a substantive law “creates duties, rights and obligations.”125 On
the other hand, procedural statutes prescribe the methods of enforcing these rights or
of obtaining redress.126
Procedural statutes typically involve rules of practice or procedure and methods
of court review.127 Substantive statutes, however, typically impair or take away
vested rights,128 affect accrued substantive rights,129 impose new or additional
burdens, duties, obligations or liabilities on individuals,130 create new rights,131 or
give rise to or take away the right to sue or defend actions132 in a court of law.133
4. Substantive Rights under Article IV, Section 5(B)
Historically, Ohio courts have been willing to recognize the substantive quality
of legislation that conflicts with rules of court procedure under Article IV, section
5(B).134 In Boyer v. Boyer, the trial court, after reviewing the documents submitted
in a custody battle, determined both parents fit to raise their child.135 However, the
court, empowered by a statutory provision in the Ohio Revised Code, awarded

124

Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 522 N.E.2d 489, 497 (Ohio 1988) (superseded
by statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01 (WEST 2007).
125
Kilbreath v. Rudy, 242 N.E.2d 658, 660 (Ohio 1968) (finding Ohio long-armed statues
to be procedural in nature rather than substantive).
126

Id.

127

State ex rel. Slaughter v. Indus. Comm’n., 9 N.E.2d 505, 543-34 (Ohio 1937) (citing
County of Miami v. City of Dayton, 110 N.E. 726, 728 (Ohio 1915).
128

See State ex rel. South Euclid v. Zangerle, 62 N.E.2d 160, 163 (Ohio 1945).

129

See In re Nevious 191 N.E.2d 166, 169-70 (Ohio 1963).

130

See Miller v. Hixson, 59 N.E. 749, 752 (Ohio 1901).

131

See Zangerle, 14 N.E.2d at 934.

132

See Smith v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 170 N.E. 637, 638 (Ohio 1930).

133

Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 522 N.E.2d 489, 496 (Ohio 1988).

134
See Boyer v. Boyer, 346 N.E.2d 286 (Ohio 1976) (holding that because OHIO R. CIV. P.
75(P) abridges the statutory right provided under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (West
2007). The rule is invalid under the provisions of Section 5 of Article IV of the Ohio
Constitution), State v. Rahman, 492 N.E.2d 401, 404-05 (Ohio 1986) (holding in part that
Rule 601(B) of the Ohio Rules of Evidence is superseded by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.42
(West 2007), as to spousal privilege because §. 2945.42 codifies a substantive right because
“the Rules of Evidence in Ohio are limited by Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio
Constitution to procedural effect only”). But see Armstrong v. The Portsmith Times, No. 1259,
1980 WL 351014, (at *2 Ohio Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1980) (“R.C. 2317.27 clearly does not create,
define or regulate the substantive rights of parties”).
135

Boyer, 346 N.E.2d at 287.

138

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 21:123

custody to the child’s grandmother instead.136 The parents appealed, arguing that the
Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure only permitted such a maneuver upon a finding “that
neither parent is a suitable person to have custody.”137
The Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that under the Modern Courts
Amendment138 when “conflicts arise between the . . . [rules of procedure] and the
statutory law, the rule will control the statute on matters of procedure and the statute
will control on matters of substantive law.”139 The Court then acknowledged the
substantive nature of the child custody statute.140 The law embodied the traditional
power “of the courts to make the final determination of the best interests of [the]
child in custody disputes,” 141 a fundamental power in family law jurisprudence.
Under Section 5(B) of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, the child custody statute
as a substantive law must therefore control.142 The rule of procedure affecting child
custody would be superseded where it conflicted with the substantive provisions of
the statute.143
Another decision addressing the interplay of the Ohio statutory provisions and
the Rules of Evidence under Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution
occurred in State v. Rahman.144 This case is particularly illuminating because it
addressed, in part, a conflict between the competency of a witness under Rule 601
and an Ohio statute codifying the spousal privilege.145
In Rahman, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized that Rule 601(B), which governs
the competency of spouses,146 displaces all statutory provisions as a rule of court
procedure.147 However, this sovereignty dissipates when it encroaches upon
136

Id.

137

Id. at 288 (citing OHIO R. CIV. P. 75(P)). Prior to its nullification, the rule required
that: “If the court finds, with respect to any child under eighteen years of age, that neither
parent is a suitable person to have custody, it may commit the child to any other relative of the
child.” Id.
138

The Modern Courts Amendment is a reference to Section 5(B) of Article IV of the Ohio
Constitution. See discussion supra, Part III, Section A.
139

Boyer, 346 N.E.2d at 288.

140

Id.

141

Id. (citing Portage County Welfare Dept. v. Summers, 311 N.E.2d 6, 12 (Ohio 1974)).

142

Id.

143

Id.

144

State v. Rahman, 492 N.E.2d 401 (Ohio 1986).

145

Id. at 403-06. The statute in question was OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.42 (West

2006).
146

OHIO R. EVID. 601(B) provides: “Every person is competent to be a witness except: . . .
(B) A spouse testifying against the other spouse charged with a crime except when either of
the following applies: (1) a crime against the testifying spouse or a child of either spouse is
charged; (2) the testifying spouse elects to testify.”
Note the court addressed the competency of an expert under OHIO R. EVID. 601(B), not
under OHIO R. EVID. 601(D), which governs the competency of medical experts.
147

Rahman, 492 N.E. 2d at 404.
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fundamental, substantive rights. The Ohio Supreme Court held that under Section
5(B) of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, the statute codifying the spousal
privilege148 superseded Rule 601(B)149 because the spousal privilege “create[d] a
substantive right which [could] not be abridged”150 by any rule of court procedure.
Under the Ohio Constitution, Rule 601(B) would be nullified when it impacted the
fundamental privilege of spouses to be secure in their private communications.
This discussion demonstrates that the Ohio Supreme Court has been receptive to
recognizing the preemptive qualities of substantive rights under Article IV of the
Ohio Constitution. However, the Ohio Supreme Court has never directly addressed
the substantive nature of the medical statute under the Modern Courts Amendment.
The only instance in which the Ohio Supreme Court even discussed the qualities of
the medical expert statute occurred obliquely in Denicola v. Providence Hospital.151
Denicola involved a medical malpractice action initiated prior to the enactment
of the medical expert statute.152 By the time the trial had convened, the legislature
had passed the law regulating the competency of medical experts.153 Under the new
statute’s stringent requirements, the witness could no longer be considered
competent to testify.154 The defendant therefore objected to his continued
participation in the trial.155 The trial court sustained the objection.156 Without a
medical expert, the plaintiff’s claim had been effectively destroyed, and the judge
granted the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.157
The plaintiff appealed this decision to the Ohio Supreme Court, arguing that the
application of the medical expert statute in the present case violated Article II,
Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution.158 Article II, Section 28 prohibits the general
assembly from enacting retroactive laws.159 The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this
148
The spousal privilege prevents a husband or a wife from testifying “concerning a
communication made by one to the other, or act done by either in the presence of the other
during coverture, unless the communication was made or acted one in the known presence or
hearing of a third person.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.42 (West 2006).
149

Id. at 405.

150

Id.

151

See Denicola v. Providence Hosp., 387 N.E.2d 231 (Ohio 1979).

152

Id. at 233. The statute became effective on July 28, 1975. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2743.43 (West 2006).
153

Denicola, 387 N.E.2d at 233.

154

Id.

155

Id. at 231.

156

Id.

157

Id. This result provides a compelling example of the essential nature that medical
experts play in medical malpractice litigation. Without her expert the plaintiff could not
establish the requisite standard of care, effectively eliminating her claim.
158
159

Id. at 233.

OHIO CONST. art. II, § 28. The language of the section reads as follows:
The general assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive laws, or laws impairing
the obligation of contracts; but may, by general laws, authorize courts to carry into
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argument. Basing its decision on prior precedent, the Supreme Court held that “R.C.
2743.43 was not retrospectively applied . . . it was properly applied prospectively,
since the trial took place after its [the medical expert statute] effective date.”160
As an initial matter, two limitations on the Court’s decision must be noted. First,
the Ohio Supreme Court’s interpretation centered on the remedial nature of the
medical expert statute under Section 28 of Article II, not the conflict between the
medical statute and Rule 601(D) under Section 5(B) of Article IV of the Ohio
Constitution. Second, the plaintiffs in Denicola conceded the procedural nature of
the medical expert statute. Thus, the substantive qualities of the statute were never
argued before the Ohio Supreme Court.161
While the precedential impact of this decision upon the present analysis may be
questionable, it is still imperative to note the Ohio Supreme Court’s assumption that
the medical expert statute “is of a remedial or procedural nature.”162 The impact of
this conclusion upon the present analysis is uncertain. However, what influence this
assumption should have upon the medical expert statute and its interplay among the
Ohio Rules of Evidence must be negated by the Court’s conclusory dismissal of
fundamental rights inhering in those suffering from the hands of negligent doctors.
Any provision that dictates the qualifications of medical experts impacts the
substantive rights of tort victims in two very real and fundamental ways. First, any
law affecting the competence of a medical expert directly impacts a tort victim’s
ability to obtain a trial by jury. Second, any law affecting the competence of a
medical expert directly impacts a tort victim’s ability to gain access to a court of law.
The result is that rules affecting the competence of medical experts implicate more
than simply the procedural stance of a medical malpractice victim. Rules affecting
the competency of medical experts impact the very essence of an individual’s
substantive right to pursue complex medical malpractice cases. Without the ability
to obtain a medical expert, these tort victims cannot obtain redress in a court of law.

effect, upon such terms as shall be just and equitable, the manifest intention of parties,
and officers, by curing omissions, defects, and errors, in instruments and proceedings,
arising out of their want of conformity with the laws of this state.
Id.
160
Denicola, 387 N.E.2d at 233. In reaching this holding, the Ohio Supreme Court relied
upon its prior precedent in State ex rel. Holdridge v. Indus. Comm’n, 228 N.E.2d 621, 623
(Ohio 1967) (“[I]n general terms, substantive law is that which creates duties, rights, and
obligations, while procedural or remedial law prescribes methods of enforcement of rights or
obtaining redress.”).
161

Denicola, 387 N.E.2d at 233. There is no explanation in this or the lower decision why
the plaintiff never argued the substantive nature of the medical expert statute. Most likely this
decision resulted from the fact that no Rule of Evidence existed at the time to conflict with the
statute.
162

Id. For a discussion on the difference between substantive and remedial laws, see
Kilbreath v. Rudy, 242 N.E.2d. 658, 660 (Ohio 1968) (“Substantive law is that which creates
duties, rights and obligations, while procedural or remedial law prescribes the methods of
enforcement of rights or obtaining redress.”).
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5. The Right to a Jury Trial
It is a bedrock principal of our justice system that the right to a jury trial is a
substantive rather than procedural right.163 This privilege cannot be disturbed,
desecrated, or violated.164 The ancestry of the right to a jury trial can be traced to
English common law.165 There, the right became enshrined in the Magna Carta and
transported across the Atlantic with the colonists.166 Here, it flourished and was
embodied in the Constitution of the United States.167 The right to a jury trial was
“formally extended to Ohioans [in] the Northwest Ordinance”168 and became
encapsulated in the Ohio Constitution.169 The right to a jury trial is not simply a
procedural grant, it is a fundamental right inhering in every citizen.170
This inalienable right, however, does not exist in every circumstance. The
entitlement only manifests itself in those instances when it “existed at common law
prior to the adoption of” the Ohio Constitution.171 In Sorrell v. Thevenir, the Ohio
Supreme Court acknowledged that right to a jury trial for negligence litigation
antedates the Ohio Constitution.172 Thus, the right to a trial by jury for all negligence
victims is a substantive right that cannot be abridged or circumscribed by any rule of
court procedure.173

163

47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 9 (2006). See also Earnest v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Ala.,
494 So. 2d 80, 82 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986); Sidenstricker v. Miller Pavement Maint., Inc., 815
N.E.2d 736, 740 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (“The right to a jury trial is substantive rather than
procedural.”); Betz v. Timken Mercy Med. Ctr., 644 N.E.2d 1058 (Ohio Ct. App. 5th Dist.
1994) (“Fundamental to our justice system is the right to a jury of our peers.”).
164
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 5. “The right of trial by jury shall be inviolate, except that, in civil
cases, laws may be passed to authorize the rendering of a verdict by concurrence of not less
than three-fourths of the jury.” Id; see also Gibbs v. Village of Girard, 102 N.E. 299, (Para.
two of syllabus Ohio 1913) (finding “[the] right of trial by jury, being guaranteed to all our
citizens by the constitution of the state, cannot be invaded or violated.”).
165

Belding v. State ex rel. Heifner, 169 N.E. 301, 302 (Ohio 1929) (holding Section 5 of
article 1 of the Ohio Constitution only guarantees the right of a trial by jury in those instances
where it existed previous to its adoption).
166

Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Halliday, 188 N.E. 1, 3 (Ohio 1933) (holding that the right to a
trial by jury is a substantive right, not a procedural matter); see also Wikipedia, Magna Carta,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magna_ Carta (last visited Nov. 16, 2006).
167

Halliday, 188 N.E. at 3.

168

Kneisley v. Lattimer-Stevens Co., 533 N.E.2d 743, 746 (Ohio 1988) (holding that OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(D) (West 2006) may not be retroactively applied because the right
to a jury trial for intentional torts existed at common law and is therefore a substantive right).
169

Belding, 169 N.E. at 302; see also Gibbs, 102 N.E. at 300.

170

Halliday, 188 N.E. at 3.

171

Kneisley, 533 N.E.2d at 746; see also Belding, 169 N.E. 301 at syllabus.

172

Sorrell v. Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504, 510 (Ohio 1994) (holding the right to a jury trial in
negligence and personal injury actions is a fundamental right).
173

Kneisley, 533 N.E.2d at 746.
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Medical malpractice is a specialized branch of the negligence tree.174 Victims
who pursue claims under this vein are afforded the same substantive rights and
protections as any other tort victim. Unlike traditional tort victims, however, victims
of medical malpractice are peculiarly reliant upon medical experts to gain access to a
court of law.175 Medical expert testimony is a fundamental prerequisite to pursuing
any such claim.176 Without a medical expert to establish the requisite standard of
care and to establish this, the defendant failed to meet this standard, a plaintiff will
never reach a jury.177 Any rule, therefore, affecting the competency of a medical
expert substantially impacts a tort victim’s substantive right to a trial by jury.
By expanding or contracting a victim’s ability to access a medical expert, rules
governing the competency of medical experts expand or contract the individual’s
very right to a trial by jury. The result is that rules regulating medical experts affect
substantive rights and are not procedural rules. Because the Ohio Constitution
prohibits the Supreme Court from promulgating rules affecting substantive rights,
Rule 601(D) must have no force or affect, and the statute governing medical expert
testimony must control. Medical experts should be obligated to devote three-fourths
of their professional time to the active clinical practice of medicine, as prescribed by
the medical expert statute.
6. Access to the Courts
Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution guarantees that every citizen “shall
have a remedy by due course of law” for any injury to land, property, or person.178
While Ohio uses the unique phrase “due course of law,” the clause has been
interpreted to be the functional equivalent of the due process clause179 found in the

174

See discussion supra Part II, Section A.

175

Id.

176

DOBBS, supra note 33, at 639. “[C]ourts require the plaintiff to establish the medical
‘standard’ itself by expert testimony.” Id. See, e.g., Brannan v. Lankenau Hosp., 417 A.2d
196, 199 (Pa. 1980) (“To satisfy his burden of proving [. . . medical malpractice] appellant
must introduce expert testimony to show that appellee physicians conduct varied from
accepted medical practice.”).
177

See Hart v. Van Zandt, 399 S.W.2d 791, 792 (Tex. 1965).
In determining negligence in a case such as this, which concerns the highly specialized
art of treating disease, the court and jury must be dependent on expert testimony.
There can be no other guide, and where want of skill and attention is not thus shown
by expert evidence applied to the facts, there is no evidence of it proper to be
submitted to the jury.

Id.
See also discussion supra Part II, Section A; Cross v. Huttenlocher, 440 A.2d 952, 954
(Conn. 1981) (“To prevail in a malpractice case the plaintiff must establish through expert
testimony both the standard of care and the fact that the defendant’s conduct did not measure
up to that standard.”).
178
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16. “All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and
shall have justice administered without denial or delay.” Id.
179
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.)” U.S. CONST. amend IV, § 1 (“No State shall . . .
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United States Constitution.180 There is no difference between the United States and
the Ohio Constitution regarding due process of law.181
The Due Process Clause encompasses two distinct limitations upon government
action, procedural and substantive due process.182 Procedural due process ensures
that the government provide some form of notice and an adequate opportunity to be
heard before it deprives a person of life, liberty or property.183 In contrast,
“substantive due process insists that the law itself be fair and reasonable and have an
adequate justification regardless of how fair or elaborate the procedures might be for
implementing it.”184 The rights protected under the substantive strand of the due
process clause are “independent of any . . . textual guarantee[] found in the
Constitution.”185 The result is that substantive due process encompasses a much
broader sweep of liberty interests than procedural due process.
An eclectic amalgam of rights has emerged over the years under this branch of
the due process clause,186 from the right to privacy to the right to direct the
upbringing of one’s child.187 The Supreme Court of the United States has also
“recognized a limited due process right of access to courts [which is] violated by
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”.) The Fifth
Amendment “operates as a limit on the power of the national government, while the
[Fourteenth Amendment] operates against the power of the states . . . Since both clauses
operate in essentially the same fashion, albeit against different governmental bodies, [they are
referred] collectively as the Due Process Clause.” ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY,
EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 53 (3d ed. 2004).
180

17 OHIO JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 493.

181

Id. See also State v. French, 73 N.E. 216, 217 (Ohio 1905) (An act protecting fish and
game declared constitutional under the both Due Process Clauses of the United States and the
Ohio Constitutions – there is no difference respecting the two clauses); Direct Plumbing
Supply Co. v. City of Dayton, 38 N.E.2d 70, 72 (Ohio 1941) (“The ‘due course of law’ clause
of Section 16, Article 1 of the Ohio Constitution, has been considered the equivalent of the
‘due process of law’ clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
182

IDES & MAY, supra note 179, at 54. See also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 210 (2004). Procedural due process only requires that
there be some “fair decision-making process before the government takes some action directly
impairing a person’s life, liberty or property.” Id. Substantive due process addresses the
“constitutionality of the underlying rule rather than the fairness of the process by which the
government applies the rule to an individual.” Id. Under this thread of the due process clause
the Supreme Court examines the substance of the law or governmental action. Id.
183

IDES & MAY, supra note 179, at 54.

184

Id. Due process originates from England, where it served as a protection from
“arbitrary action on the part of the Crown.” 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 911
(2006). Beginning in the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court began applying due process
to substantive rights. Id.
185

IDES & MAY, supra note 179, at 54.

186

Substantive federal rights can only be created under the federal constitution. 16B AM.
JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 911 (2006). “[A]s a general matter, the Supreme Court is
reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process, because guideposts for responsible
decision making in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended.” Id.
187

IDES & MAY, supra note 179, at 54-116.
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government action that prevents a party from filing a lawsuit.”188 This substantive
right is implicated by any rule that impacts a litigant’s access to a medical expert in
malpractice litigation.189
Right to access court cases typically occur in two general categories.190 The first
class of cases occurs when a plaintiff’s overtures to litigate a potential claim are
stymied by some official action that deprives the person of the opportunity to do
so.191 The second class of cases occurs when some “specific litigation ended poorly,
or could not have commenced, or could have produced a remedy subsequently
unobtainable.”192

188
Id. at 116. See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971) (“[D]ue process
requires, at a minimum, that absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance,
persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be
given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 414-15
(2002) (“[T]he very point of recognizing any access claim is to provide some effective
vindication for a separate and distinct right to seek judicial relief for some wrong.”); Bremiller
v. Cleveland Psychiatric Instit., 879 F.Supp. 782, 792 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (“Access to the courts
is a substantive due process right”); 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 945 (2006) (“An
opportunity for a hearing before a competent and impartial tribunal upon proper notice is one
of the essential elements of due process.”) See also IDES & MAY, supra note 179, at 54-116.
Right to access courts claims occur in two basic categories: “(1) those in which the
government has created an impediment to the present filing of a lawsuit; and (2) those in
which the government took action in the past that prevented filing a claim that is now
foreclosed.” Id. at 116.
189

See, e.g., John E. Nowak et al., Constitutional Law § 13.10 (3d ed. 1986).
If a state law allows persons to bring suit in state court to redress alleged grievances
against public or private agencies, it cannot arbitrarily deny an individual the ability to
use those judicial procedures. The arbitrary refusal to allow individuals to use the
established state court process would seem to be invalid under even the most minimal
due process or equal protection standards.

Id.
See also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429 (1982) (“The Court
traditionally has held that the Due Process Clauses protect civil litigants who seek recourse in
the courts, either as defendants hoping to protect their property or as plaintiffs attempting to
redress grievances.”).
190

IDES & MAY, supra note 179, at 116-17. See also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S.
403, 412-14 (2002) (holding that the defendant did not state a claim for denial of judicial
access).
191
Christopher, 536 U.S. at 413. The gravamen of such a claim is “that systematic official
action frustrates a plaintiff . . . in preparing and filing suits at the present time.” Id. The
impediment presently frustrates the litigant’s ability to enter the court room doors – however it
does not deny the opportunity to litigate for all time. Once the impediment is lifted the litigant
is free to pursue his or her claim. Id. The rationale “for recognizing that claim, is to place the
plaintiff in a position to pursue a separate claim for relief once the frustrating condition has
been removed.” Id. Examples of Court-access rights include: providing a law library for a
prisoner, Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); providing a reader for an illiterate
prisoner, Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346-48 (1996); and waiving filing fees that an
indigent litigant would be unable to pay, Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 713-14 (1961).
192

Christopher, 536 U.S. at 414.
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The rationale for either claim is to provide individuals an opportunity to seek
vindication for injuries and seek “judicial relief for some wrong” that has befallen
them.193 Regardless of whether the right to access a court claim is forward or
backward looking, it must be derived from some underlying claim.194 The right to
access a court is absolutely contingent on a legitimate, principal claim for vitality
and efficacy.
An underlying claim exists in malpractice litigation. In these cases, the principal
cause of action is negligence inflicted upon the tort victim.
Rules affecting the competency of a medical expert have the unique affect of
implicating the substantive right to access a court of law.195 Unlike any other branch
of negligence, victims of medical malpractice cannot pursue a tort action unless they
are able to obtain an expert willing to testify on their behalf.196 Any rule that
eliminates a litigant’s opportunity to access a medical expert has the effect of
slamming the doors of justice in his or her face. A medical malpractice action
cannot be pursued unless this barrier has been removed. Laws or rules that affect the
competency of a medical expert implicate more than mere rules of court procedure.
They implicate the very core of a tort victim’s right to obtain redress by functioning
as the hinge that opens or closes the doors to a court of law.
Under Ohio’s Constitutional scheme, the power to promulgate rules that
implicate substantive rights has been expressly delegated to the legislature, not the
judiciary. Ohio’s elected representatives have exercised this prerogative by passing
the medical expert law. While it might seem odd that the more stringent rule
governing the competency of medical experts should control, this does not transfer
authority to the judiciary. The medical expert statute supersedes R. 601(D) because
the rule impermissibly infringes upon the substantive rights of medical malpractice
litigants. Physicians must be required to devote three-fourths of their time to the
active clinical practice of medicine to be considered competent to testify in a medical
malpractice suit.
B. The Same or Substantially Similar Specialty Requirement.
In 2004, the Ohio legislature appended the medical expert statute, adding the
requirement that medical experts may only testify against doctors from “the same or
a substantially similar specialty.”197 This amendment furnishes a further safeguard
against illegitimate “hired gun” testimony. Because the Ohio Rules of Evidence are
devoid of a similar requirement, the legislature appears to have utilized its authority
under the Ohio Constitution to supplement the procedural rules by grafting an
additional criterion onto laws governing the competency of medical experts.198
193

Id. at 414-15.

194

Id.

195

See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) (“[A] state must afford all
individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard if it is to fulfill the promise of the Due
Process Clause.”).
196

See Hart v. Van Zandt, 399 S.W.2d 791, 792 (Tex. 1965). See also discussion supra
Part II, Section A.
197

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2743.43(A)(3) (West 2006).

198

Ohio Const. art. IV.
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This interpretation is consistent with the applicable rules of constitutional
construction. Under these rules, courts must endeavor to construe a statute in such a
way as to avoid any “constitutional infirmit[y].”199 In State v. Keenen, the Ohio
Supreme Court outlined how this analysis should proceed under Section 5(B) of
Article IV of the Ohio Constitution.200
When a potential conflict arises between a statute and another rule of evidence,
the “court is bound to give [the] statute a constitutional construction [rather than] . . .
one that raises serious questions about the statute’s constitutionality.”201 Justices
should always seek to adopt the “reading of the statute [that] would avoid any
constitutional problems.”202
State ex rel. Thompson further demonstrates the Ohio Supreme Court’s desire to
interpret statutes in such a way as to avoid any constitutional conflicts with other
rules of court procedure.203 In that case, the Court refused to construe R.C.
3109.04(C) in a manner that would create an inconsistency with the Ohio Rules of
Civil Procedure.204 Following the logic of Keenen, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted
a “construction that harmonize[d] both the statute and the pertinent rules” of
procedure.205
The “same or a substantially similar specialty” provision offers a similar
opportunity to harmonize the medical expert statute with the Ohio Rules of Evidence
in order to avoid a constitutional infirmity. By interpreting this provision as a
supplemental feature to Rule 601(D), both the statute and the rules of evidence can
be synchronized in the same manner as the Ohio Supreme Court did in State ex rel.
Thompson. As a result, the applicable rules of statutory construction dictate that the
“same or a substantially similar specialty” provision of the medical expert statute
must control as a supplemental feature to the Ohio Rules of Evidence. To find
otherwise would construe the statute in such a way as to create a constitutional
infirmity.
However, before the “same or substantially the same specialty” provision can be
read into the rules governing the competency of medical experts, several minor
issues must be explored and explained.
The first issue concerns the Staff Notes attached to Rule 601(D). The Staff Notes
state that the rule as adopted “supersedes R.C. 2743.43.”206 This Note appears to

199

State ex rel. Thompson v. Spon, 700 N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (Ohio 1998) (holding that the
court of appeals was correct in dismissing appellants mandamus claim).
200
State v. Keenen, 689 N.E.2d 929, 946 (Ohio 1998) (holding in part that it refused to
adopt defendant’s interpretation of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.82 (West 2006). Because
such an interpretation would conflict with OHIO R. EVID. 611(B), a rule of court procedure was
promulgated under Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution).
201

Id.

202

Id.

203

State ex rel. Thompson, 700 N.E.2d at 1284.

204

Id.

205

Id.

206

Ohio R. Evid. 601(D), 1980 staff note.
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evince the judicial branch’s clear intent to supplant the medical expert statute.
However, several flaws exist with this interpretation.
First, the Staff Notes have never been “adopted by the Court and are not
[considered to be] part of the rule[s].”207 Thus, the Note carries no weight beyond
mere suggestion. Second, while the rule may have superseded the language of the
medical expert statute in its initial formulation, the Ohio legislature subsequently
appended the statute in 2004, adding the provision in question. In so doing, the Ohio
representatives exercised their authority to supplement or complement the rules of
court procedure with non-contradictory legislation.208 Because the Rules of Evidence
are silent concerning the competency of medical experts to testify against other
doctors across medical specialties, the amended medical expert statute does not
conflict with Rule 601(D). As a result, the legislature has grafted an additional
supplemental provision onto the Ohio rules governing the competency of medical
experts.
The second issue concerns the final clause in Rule 601(D).209 This clause
provides that Rule 601(D) shall not prohibit medical experts “who otherwise are
competent to testify under these rules from giving expert testimony on the
appropriate standard of care in their own profession,”210 in an action against any
other physician or medical professional.
A potential reading could be elicited from this language that the rule empowers
medical experts to testify against other medical professionals, regardless of their
specialty. This reading would directly conflict with the “similar specialty” provision
of the medical expert statute, which prohibits medical experts from doing just that.211
However, the judiciary did not intend such a result when they added this language to
Rule 601(D).
The Ohio Supreme Court added the final clause to Rule 601(D) in order to
prohibit the application of the competency rule when medical professionals are
necessary to testify about the appropriate standard of care within their own field.212
207

OHIO R. EVID. 101, Refs & Annos (2006).
The Supreme Court Advisory Committee prepared the Staff Notes for each of the
substantive rule amendments . . . Although the Supreme Court used the Staff Notes as
background for its deliberations, the Staff Notes are not adopted by the Court and are
not part of the rule . . . [T]he Staff Notes represent the views of the Rules Advisory
Committee and are not necessarily the views of the Supreme Court.
Id.
208

OHIO CONST. art. IV.

209

OHIO R. EVID. 601(D).
This division shall not prohibit other medical professionals who are otherwise
competent to testify under these rules from giving expert testimony on the appropriate
standard of care in their own profession in any claim asserted in any civil action
against a physician, podiatrist, medical professional, or hospital arising out of the
diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person.
Id.
210

Id.

211

See supra note 25. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2743.43(A)(2) (West 2006).

212

OHIO R. EVID. 601(D), 1991 staff note. See also JAMES T. O’REILLY, OHIO PERSONAL
INJURY PRACTICE § 14:4 (2006). “Medical malpractice applies not only to physicians and
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Prior to the insertion of this language, several courts had held that a nurse could not
be considered “competent under Rule 601(D) to testify about the standard of” care
for nurses in malpractice actions against doctors.213 The additional language in Rule
601(D) prevents this unusual practice from occurring.214 As a result, the final clause
of Rule 601(D) has no bearing on the competency of a medical expert to testify
concerning the appropriate standard of care for a physician from a different specialty.
The language of Rule 601(D) does not conflict with the “same or a substantially
similar specialty” provision of the medical expert statute.
Because the appropriate rules of statutory construction dictate an interpretation
that ensures the constitutionality of the medical expert statutes and because the
“same or a substantially similar specialty” provision does not conflict with any
language in Rule 601(D), the provision must supplement the Ohio Rules of
Evidence. The Ohio legislature has successfully grafted an additional requirement
onto the rules of court procedure; medical experts should be prohibited from
testifying across medical specialties.
V. PART V
Conclusion
Dr. Sandu’s story concludes on a positive note. A unanimous jury exonerated
him of all wrongdoing. After the verdict, Dr. Sandu’s lawyer spoke with some of the
jury members. They informed the lawyer that they found the plaintiff’s expert to be
so thoroughly incompetent that they would refuse treatment from him if offered.215
The jury also stated that they found Dr. Sandu’s conduct exemplified the best
rules of his profession.216 Dr. Sandu’s account provides a vivid example of why the
testimony of medical experts must be regulated. If medicine is to remain a viable
industry, quality physicians like Dr. Sandu must be insulated from frivolous
litigation allied with “hired gun” testimony. Doctors must be protected from
condemnation by “experts” no longer practicing medicine and testifying in arenas
outside their areas of expertise. At the same time, victims of legitimate medical
mistakes must be provided open avenues to seek redress.
Ohio has attempted to draw this line with legislation designed to stifle access to
purchased testimony. This legislation, however, clashes in part with Ohio evidentiary
rules governing the competency of witnesses. Whether the legislature has struck the
proper balance between the interests of physicians and tort victims is far from
surgeons, but also to dentists, chiropractors, podiatrists, optometrists, nurses and hospitals.” Id.
For a complete list of individuals who may be named as a defendant in a medical malpractice
action within the state of Ohio, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.113(E) (West 2006).
213
OHIO R. EVID. 601(D), 1991 staff note. See also Harter v. Wadsworth-Rittman Hosp.,
580 N.E.2d 506 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (trial court did not err in finding that a nurse was not
competent to testify under R. 601(D) in suit alleging negligent provision of medical care by a
nursing staff).
214

Ohio R. Evid. 601(D), 1991 staff note.

215

Telephone Interview with Anonymous, Cardiovascular Surgeon, in Cleveland, Ohio
(Oct. 18, 2006).
216

Id. The jury members actually stated that they wanted him to be their physician and
would recommend his services to any person requiring cardiovascular surgery. Id.
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certain.217 What is certain is that the authority to ascertain this balance has been
exclusively delegated to the legislature under the Ohio Constitution.
Under Article IV, Section 5(B), rules of procedure that impact the substantive
rights of Ohio citizens are considered far too important to be encroached upon by the
judiciary. Rules affecting substantive rights, therefore, have been expressly
delegated to the legislature. Because rules that regulate the competency of medical
experts inevitably encroach upon the ability of a tort victim to seek redress in a court
of law, such rules impact substantive rights in very real and tangible ways. As a
result, the medical expert statute must control. To find otherwise would permit the
judiciary to encroach upon the substantive rights of Ohio citizens, something
expressly prohibited by the Ohio Constitution. However, even if the medical expert
statute does not govern, its provision requiring that medical experts practice in the
same or substantially the same specialty still controls as a supplementary regulation
to the rules of court procedure permissible under the Ohio Constitution.

217

Such an inquiry is beyond the reach of this article.

